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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, as the United States economy was in a deep
recession, fear over a collapse of the secured lending markets
proliferated As auto sales dwindled, dealers shut their doors, and
leading parts manufacturers filed for bankruptcy, Chrysler, LLC
(Chrysler) 2 and General Motors (GM) accepted government
loans.3 When these loans proved insufficient to restore Chrysler
and GM to financial health, the companies filed for bankruptcy.4
The government's role in both Chrysler's and GM's bankruptcies
raised significant concern from secured lenders and market
observers alike.' Many investors were outraged that the
government not only would invest in these companies but also
1. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the United States, Address on Financial
Regulatory Reform to Leaders of the Financial Community (Sept. 14, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Financial-
Rescue-and-Reform-at-Federal-Hall/ ("This was no longer just a financial crisis; it
had become a full-blown economic crisis.").
2. It should be noted that "Old Carco, LLC," formerly know as "Chrysler,
LLC," and now commonly referred to as "Old Chrysler," is the company that is
undergoing Chapter 11. See Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions, Chapter 11 Proceeding
General Information, http://chapterll.epiq systems.com/clientdefault.aspx?pk=lc8f7
215-f675-41bf-a79b-elb2cb9c8fO&l=1 (last visited Jan. 10, 2010). This Comment
refers to "Old Chrysler" or "Old Carco LLC" as simply "Chrysler."
3. See Richard S. Chang, Chrysler Dealer Closing Means Deals for Buyers, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (May 21, 2009, 10:00 EST), http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/
05/21/chrysler-dealer-closings-mean-deals-for-buyers/ (noting that Chrysler has
closed or will close a total of 789 dealerships around the country); Mark J. Roe, The
Chrysler Bankruptcy Sale: An Assessment, FORBES, June 15, 2009, http://www.for
bes.com/2009/06/14/chrysler-uaw-bankruptcy-fiat-opinions-contributors-general-
motors.html ("Chrysler was, like General Motors, specially situated as a visibly
troubled company in a traditionally important industry, suffering during a severe
economic downturn."); In re Delphi, No. 05-44481(RDD), 2009 WL 2482146 (Bnkr.
S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2009) (ruling on the bankruptcy of auto parts supplier Delphi
Corp.).
4. In re Chrysler, LLC et al., 405 B.R. 85, 90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), affd, 576
F.3d 108 (2nd Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v.
Chrysler LLC, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009); In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
5. See infra pp. 525-27 and notes 87-99.
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would lead bankruptcy negotiations that supposedly improperly
subordinated the interests of secured creditors to those of
unsecured creditors.6 Yet, contrary to popular criticism, Chrysler's
recent bankruptcy proceeding did not impermissibly subordinate
the interests of secured creditors to those of the unsecured
creditors. Most importantly, Chrysler's bankruptcy proceeding did
not alter substantive bankruptcy law in a way that hampers
secured lending in the United States.
This Comment begins by analyzing Chrysler's tumultuous
history.7 The Comment then explains Chrysler's bankruptcy
proceedings and explores Chrysler's § 363 sale.8 Next, Part IV
details the objections of both outside observers and the creditors
who brought suit seeking to stop the sale.9 Then, the Comment
maintains that it was not only legal but also pragmatic and savvy to
sell Chrysler's assets before entering a formal Chapter 11
bankruptcy plan.10  The Comment then argues that the
negotiations between the TARP-backed banks and the executive
branch were fair and did not overstep legal or ethical boundaries."
Next, the Comment concludes that no new standard has been set
by Chrysler's bankruptcy proceeding and that this case does
nothing to alter substantive bankruptcy law in the United States.
Finally, the Comment discusses several minor changes to secured
lending that will likely result from the publicity surrounding
Chrysler's § 363 sale.13
6. See Bill Visnic, Chrysler Dissident Investors Cave; Political, Legal Wounds
Linger, EDMUNDS, May 11, 2009, http://www.autoobserver.com/2009/05/chrysler-
dissident-investors-cave-political-legal-wounds-linger.html; Declan McCullagh,
Chrysler Bankruptcy Exposes Dirty Politics, CBSNEWS.COM, May 7, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/05/07/politics/otherpeoplesmoney/main4997900.
shtml.
7. See infra pp. 517-19 and notes 14-35.
8. See infra pp. 519-21 and notes 36-57. A § 363 sale is a sale of assets pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) that takes place prior to, or as a part of, a company entering
into a formal Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan. 11 U.S.C. §363 (2006). This concept is
discussed in depth infra pp. 522-25 and notes 59-86.
9. See infra Part IV, pp. 525-39.
10. See infra pp. 527-34.
11. See infra pp. 534-39.
12. See infra pp. 539-42.
13. See infra pp. 542-44.
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II. CHRYSLER'S JOURNEY TO AND THROUGH BANKRUPTCY
Chrysler, the legendary car company that produces iconic
cars such as the Jeep Wrangler and the Dodge Viper, has a history
of ups and downs.14 Founded in 1925, Chrysler successfully
navigated the Great Depression and World War II by maintaining
innovative technology and strong product offerings. 15 Due in part
to the oil crisis and an ineffective overseas expansion, Chrysler
suffered dire financial troubles and sought a government bailout in
the 1970s.16 After repaying a majority of the government loans by
the early 1980s, Chrysler acquired American Motors, the fourth-
largest automaker in the United States.17 This led Chrysler into
another financial crisis and prompted the company to reorganize
again. 8 In 1998, Daimler-Benz merged with Chrysler to form
DaimlerChrysler. 9 In 2007, Daimler sold Chrysler to the private
investment firm Cerberus Capital Management.2°
In 2007, Chrysler began a global search for a strategic
partner who could help Chrysler expand product offerings and
retail locations.2' Chrysler discussed alliances with a number of
competitors including: "GM, Fiat S.p.A. (Fiat), Nissan, Hyundai-
Kia, Toyota, Volkswagen, Tata Motors, GAZ Group, Magna
International, Mitsubishi Motors, Honda, Beijing Automotive,
Tempo International Group, Hawtai Automobiles and Chery
Automobile Co. ' '22 Despite its efforts, Chrysler was unable to
secure a partner by the fall of 2008.23
Due to a number of factors, including the company's
inability to find a strategic partner, Chrysler was drastically
14. Micheline Maynard, Chrysler: A Short History, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01[business/01history.html.
15. Chrysler History, http://www.edmunds.com/chrysler/history.html.
16. See id.
17. Maynard, supra note 14.
1& Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See In re Chrysler, LLC et al., 405 B.R. 89, 90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
22. Id. at 90.
23. Id.
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affected by the global credit crunch of 2008.24 In July 2008, amid
significant job loss and a lack of consumer confidence in the
economy, Chrysler announced that year-to-date sales had plunged
twenty-nine percent over the same period in 2007.2' Chrysler
suffered from disastrous liquidity problems and, during 2008, the
company suffered a net loss of $16.8 billion.26 In late 2008,
Chrysler received $4 billion dollars in government loans.27 One
term of the loans required Chrysler to submit a plan (Viability
Plan) showing that it was able to sustain long-term viability and
become a strong competitor in the U.S. marketplace.28
While seeking the initial loans from the government,
29Chrysler simultaneously pursued a strategic alliance with Fiat. In
January 2009, Chrysler and Fiat entered into a preliminary deal
that was partly conditioned on Chrysler meeting the requirements
of the Viability Plan.30 The Viability Plan called for Chrysler to
file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and emerge as a profitable
company as quickly as possible.3'
President Obama's Auto Task Force, a committee created
to assist the President with auto industry related policy,
conditionally approved Chrysler's Viability Plan in March 2009.32
As a part of this conditional acceptance, Chrysler and Fiat, with
the assistance of the Auto Task Force, negotiated a new collective
bargaining agreement with Chrysler's major labor union, the
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
24. See id.; see also Maynard, supra note 14 ("[Chrysler], like others in Detroit,
was battered by a deep sales slump last year as a recession took hold.").
25. See Ben Rooney, Consumer Spending Loses Steam, CNNMONEY.COM,
September 29, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2008/O9/29/news/economy/personal-in
come..spending/index.htm; Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Unemployment in July 2008 (Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
empsit08012008.pdf; Press Release, Chrysler LLC, Chrysler LLC Reports July 2008
U.S. Sales (Aug. 1, 2008), http://www2.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=
109&STORY=/www/story/08-01-2008/0004860329&EDATE=.
26. In re Chrysler, LLC et al., 405 B.R. 85 at 90.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES' AUTO TASK FORCE,
DETERMINATION OF VIABILITY SUMMARY: CHRYSLER, LLC 5 (2009).
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Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), as well as a
settlement with Chrysler's secured lenders.33 On April 30, 2009,
Chrysler and twenty-four of its domestic subsidiaries filed for
bankruptcy in New York under Chapter 11 of the United States
Code.34 At the time of the filing, Chrysler's bankruptcy was the
fifth largest in U.S. history.35
Several days after Chrysler filed for bankruptcy, a
collection of secured creditors led by the Indiana State Police
Pensions Trust, the Indiana State Teachers Retirement Fund, and
the Indiana Major Moves Construction Fund (collectively,
Objecting Creditors) formed in opposition to the proceedings.36
Despite their opposition, the bankruptcy court approved a sale of
substantially all of Chrysler's assets on May 31, 2009.3 ' The
Objecting Creditors subsequently appealed to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals.38 On June 5, 2009, the Second Circuit affirmed
the bankruptcy court's decision.39 The Supreme Court denied the
Objecting Creditors' petition for further review.40 Finally, on June
10, 2009, less than two weeks after the bankruptcy court first
approved the sale, the assets of Chrysler were sold to New CarCo
Acquisition, LLC (New Chrysler). 41
Chrysler and its partners selected what is commonly known
as a § 363 sale described in that section of the Bankruptcy Code
33. See Press Release, US Treas. Dep't of Public Affairs, Obama Administration
Auto Restructuring Initiative Chrysler-Fiat Alliance (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.fin
ancialstability.gov/latest/tg__043009.html; In re Chrysler LLC, et al., 405 B.R. at 92.
34. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom.
Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009).
35. See Linda Sandler et al., Obama's 60-Day Chrysler Bankruptcy Goal Covers
Only Asset Sale, BLOOMBERG, May 13, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=20601087&sid=aJaOP8qxSNgo.
36. In re Chrysler LLC, et al., 405 B.R. at 93.
37. Id. at 90.
38. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 108.
39. Id.
40. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2275 (2009).
41. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 112. "New Chrysler" is the newly created
company that purchased the assets of "Old Chrysler" and merged with Fiat. See
Brief for Appellants Indiana Pensioners, Indiana State Teachers Retirement Fund, at
44, In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants];
infra pp. 531-32 and notes 128-141.
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that regulates the procedure.42 Under a standard Chapter 11
bankruptcy, a debtor or other party of interest files a plan of
reorganization that stipulates how a debtor will be reorganized and
covers the repayment of a debtor's debts. 3 Shareholders and
creditors then vote on a plan and, if accepted, the plan is reviewed
by a court and either approved or denied." In a § 363 sale, a
debtor auctions off assets and allocates the money received to
creditors according to seniority.5 A § 363 sale often occurs prior
to the debtor officially entering into a Chapter 11 reorganization
plan.46 Chrysler needed to sell assets quickly so as to maximize
asset value, which not only would increase returns for secured
creditors but also would maintain jobs and allow for a faster return
to profitability for New Chrysler.47 Therefore, Chrysler chose to
use a § 363 sale because it allows for a quicker disposition of assets
as opposed to waiting to dispose of assets in a formal Chapter 11
plan.4
Financing for the sale to New Chrysler came from both the
American and Canadian governments. 49 As a part of the sale, New
42. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006); see Andrew Ross Sorkin, Moody's: Secured Lenders
Shouldn't Fear Chrysler Precedent, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 22, 2009, 18:05
EST), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/moodys-secured-lenders-should
nt-fear-chrysler-precedent/.
43. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123-1124 (2006).
44. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006) (specifying the voting requirements for
acceptance of a Chapter 11 plan); 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006) (specifying the
requirements that a Chapter 11 plan must meet in order to be accepted by a court).
45. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (specifying in the commentary that "if [a class is] paid
less than in full, then no class junior may receive anything under the plan"); infra
note 53.
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 363; In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 113-115.
47. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al., No. 01-00056(PJW), 2001 WL
1820326, at *3 (Bnkr. D. Del. April 2, 2001) (approving a § 363 sale in light of the
"substantial public interest in preserving the value of TWA as a going concern and
facilitating a smooth sale of substantially all of TWA's assets to American");
Stephens Indus., Inc. v. McClung, 789 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1986) (approving the sale of
a radio station that could not meet its operating expense obligations and would lose
substantial value if it ceased operations).
48. See Sorkin, supra note 42 ("The so-called 363 sale ... ] was chosen because it
was significantly faster than getting approval of a formal plan of reorganization.").
49. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 112 ("Financing for the sale transaction-$6
billion in senior secured financing, and debtor-in-possession financing for 60 days in
the amount of $4.96 billion-would come from the United States Treasury and from
Export Development Canada."). The Canadian government contributed to the
bailout because many Canadians were employed in GM's manufacturing plants
located in Canada. See The Canadian Press, Overcapacity an issue, but Chrysler
[Vol. 14
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Chrysler assumed a number of Chrysler's liabilities. ° Also, New
Chrysler paid $2 billion in return for substantially all of Chrysler's
assets.51 Several parties divided ownership of New Chrysler: 55
percent went to the UAW, 9.85 percent went to the United States
Treasury, 2.46 percent went to Export Development Canada (the
Canadian government), and 20 percent to Fiat S.p.A 2
The absolute priority rule codified under 11 U.S.C. § 507
states that senior secured creditors must be paid in full before
junior creditors receive any payment." Under this rule, when a
company enters bankruptcy, creditors' claims are prioritized
according to seniority of debt.54 Secured credit, generally the most
senior class of debt, must be reimbursed in full before lower
classes can be paid 5 Chrysler's secured creditors, who had claims
of approximately $6.9 billion dollars and a first priority lien on
virtually all of Chrysler's assets, received $2 billion, or about
twenty-nine percent of their claims. 6  Because the secured
creditors were not paid in full, lower classes should be unable to
recover any portion of their investment.57 However, the Objecting
Creditors assert that the court improperly allowed lower classes of
creditors to recover. 8
plants will open in weeks: Fiat, CANADIANMANUFACrURING.COM, June 18, 2009,
http://www.canadianmanufacturing.com/cmo/news/headline/article.jsp?content=2009
0618_095445_9644.
50. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 111-112.
51. See id.
52. See In re Chrysler LLC, et al., 405 B.R. 85, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). Also,
Fiat has the right to earn an additional fifteen percent equity stake in "New Chrysler"
if the company meets certain "performance metrics." See US Treas. Dep't of Public
Affairs, supra note 33; In re Chrysler, LLC, 576 F.3d at 112.
53. 11 U.S.C. §507 (2006); see 11 U.S.C. §1129(c)(i) and (ii); 11 U.S.C. § 1129
("[I]f [a class is] paid less than in full, then no class junior may receive anything under
the plan. This codifies the absolute priority rule.").
54. 11 U.S.C. § 507.
55. Id.
56. In re Chrysler LLC, et al., 405 B.R. at 93.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 507.
58. See In re Chrysler LLC, et al., 405 B.R. at 85.
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III. AN EXPLANATION OF § 363 SALES
A detailed historical analysis of 11 U.S.C. § 363 is beyond
the scope of this Comment. 9  Nevertheless, a general
understanding of the requirements of § 363 sales shows why its use
in the present case does not hamper secured lending. Section
363(b) allows for a company's trustee or debtor-in-possession
(DIP)6° to "use, sell, or lease" assets and pay the proceeds to its
creditors prior to court approval of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
plan.6' A court must approve a § 363 sale just as it must approve a
Chapter 11 plan.62 The sale may include "all or substantially all of
a debtor's assets." 63 The assets for sale need not be "perishable"
or sold in an "emergency." '6 Furthermore, the debtor need not
show good cause in order for a judge to approve the sale.65
Federal courts have placed restrictions on court approval of
§ 363 sales. 66 In order to approve a § 363 sale, a court must identify
an express business justification. 61 Courts typically make case-by-
59. For a detailed history of 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) and its predecessors, see Comm.
of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir.
1983); Jason Brege, Note, An Efficiency Model of Section 363(b) Sales, 92 VA. L.
REV. 1639 (Nov. 2006).
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1); BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY (3d ed. 1999) (defining
'debtor-in-possession' as "[a] Chapter 11 or 12 debtor that continues to operate its
business as a fiduciary to the bankruptcy estate. With certain exceptions, the debtor-
in-possession has all the rights, powers, and duties of a Chapter 11 trustee.").
61. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b); see also In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1070 (ruling that a
judge may authorize the sale of assets of a bankruptcy party's estate "out of the
ordinary course of business and prior to the acceptance and outside of any plan of
reorganization").
62. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(B).
63. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 116-117.
64. See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1070-1071. Note that this requirement
differs from prior statutes, namely § 116(3) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, from
which 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) emanates. Id.
65. See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1069.
66. See id. (noting that a bankruptcy judge does not have "carte blanche" when
approving a § 363 sale).
67. See id. at 1070 (noting that a court must "expressly find from the evidence
presented ... a good business reason to grant such an application."). While Lionel is
a Second Circuit decision, a number of other circuits have adopted this standard. See
In re Continental Air Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223, (5th Cir. 1986); In re Air Beds, Inc.,
92 B.R. 419, 423-424 (9th Cir. 1988); Stephens Indus., Inc. v. McClung, 789 F.2d 386,
389 (6th Cir. 1986); In re UAL Corp., 443 F.3d 565, 572 (7th Cir. 2006).
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case determinations of what constitutes "business justifications." 68
In Community of Equity Security Holders v. Lionel Corp.
(Lionel),69 a landmark decision regarding § 363 sales, the Second
Circuit listed several factors a court might consider in determining
whether to approve a § 363 sale, including:
[T]he proportionate value of the asset to the estate
as a whole, the amount of elapsed time since the
filing, the likelihood that a plan of reorganization
will be proposed and confirmed in the near future,
the effect of the proposed disposition on future
plans of reorganization, the proceeds to be obtained
from the disposition vis-A-vis any appraisals of the
property, which of the alternatives of use, sale or
lease the proposal envisions and, most importantly
perhaps, whether the asset is increasing or
decreasing in value.0
Subsequent decisions added other factors, including a
requirement that the sale is proposed in good faith and that the
purchaser act good faith." Even with these additional
requirements, courts have consistently upheld § 363 sales that
occur prior to a Chapter 11 plan approval.
68. See Brege, supra note 59, at 1652-1653 (noting that the courts have created a
standard, and not a rule, that courts should examine when deciding whether or not to
approve a § 363 sale).
69. 722 F.2d at 1070.
70. Id. at 1071.
71. See, e.g., In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 149-150 (3d Cir.
1986) ("[W]e hold that when a bankruptcy court authorizes a sale of assets pursuant
to section 363(b)(1), it is required to make a finding with respect to the "good faith"
of the purchaser."); Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al., No. 01-00056(PJW), 2001 WL
1820326, at *3 (Bnkr. D. Del. April 2, 2001) (stating that a purchaser in a § 363 sale
must act in good faith).
72. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, 2001 WL 1820326, at *3 (approving a § 363(b)
sale in light of the "substantial public interest in preserving the value of TWA as a
going concern and facilitating a smooth sale of substantially all of TWA's assets to
American"); Stephens Indus., 789 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1986) (approving the sale of a
radio station that could not meet its operating expense obligations and would lose
substantial value if it ceased operations); In re UAL Corp., 443 F.3d 565, 572 (7th Cir.
2006) (approving a § 363(b) procedure modifying a collective bargaining agreement
that had an impact on other creditors under Chapter 11); In re Air Beds, Inc., 92 B.R.
2010]
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The benefits of § 363 sales are numerous for both debtors
and creditors. First, as the Second Circuit noted, "the speed of the
process can maximize asset value by sale of the debtor's business
as a going concern., 73 Also, because the assets are sold clear of
liens, a § 363 sale often provides for the highest possible return on
the asset.74 This may allow for an otherwise unattainable recovery
for junior creditors. 75 Further, § 363 sales in conjunction with a
Chapter 11 filing offer substantial cost reduction over a Chapter 11
76filing alone. Section 363 sales can quickly address a substantial
amount of creditor's claims on debtor's assets, thus reducing the
administrative cost and complexity of a subsequent Chapter 11
filing.77 Lastly, a § 363 sale can save a company from liquidating, in
turn saving thousands of jobs, which benefits the company, its
employees, and the economy as a whole. 8
Notwithstanding the benefits, § 363 sales suffer from
• • • 79
substantial criticism. Because a § 363 sale takes place outside of a
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, many argue that § 363 has a
relaxed standard that creates an inherent conflict with the
safeguards of a normal Chapter 11 proceeding.8 A main safeguard
419, 423-424 (9th Cir. 1988) (approving the sale of various assets under 11 U.S.C.
§363(b) but denying the distribution of sale proceeds).
73. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 115.
74. See id. (noting that because assets are "typically burnished (or 'cleansed')
because (with certain limited exception) they are sold free and clear of liens, claims
and liabilities . . . . [A] § 363 sale can often yield the highest price for the assets
because the buyer can select the liabilities it will assume").
75. See Brege, supra note 59, at 1655 (noting that junior creditors have the most
to gain from the efficient disposition of assets).
76. See James J. White, Death and Resurrection of Secured Credit, 12 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 139, 164 (2004) (noting that § 363 sales are beneficial because
they result in a lower priced bankruptcy reorganization); see also Brege, supra note
59, at 1653-4 (stating that "courts have critically considered the alternative costs that
would result if a Section 363(b) sale were denied ...[alpproval of a sale in this
context saves administrative expenses down the road").
77. See id.
78. See Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al., No. 01-00056(PJW), 2001 WL 1820326,
at *14 (Bnkr. D. Del. April 2, 2001) ("There is a substantial public interest in
preserving the value of TWA as a going concern . . . . [which] includes the
preservation of jobs for TWA's 20,000 employees, the economic benefits the
continued presence of a major air carrier brings to the St. Louis region, and
preserving consumer confidence in purchased TWA tickets.").
79. See infra pp. 524-25 and notes 80-86.
80. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom.
Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009) (noting that
[Vol. 14
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of Chapter 11 is that it allows creditors an opportunity to vote on
the approval of a proposed reorganization of the debtor
company." Critics claim that § 363 sales allow debtors to create
and fulfill Chapter 11 plans all the while bypassing the creditor
approval requirement of Chapter 11.*8 In turn, there is a strong
fear that one class of creditors can "strong-arm" the trustee or DIP
into a § 363 sale, skirt Chapter 11 safeguards, and profit at the
expense of other equity or debt holders.83 As a result, critics are
concerned that a proliferation of § 363 sales might lead to a mass
circumvention of the safeguards of Chapter 11.8 These criticisms
have led some courts to refer to improper § 363 sales as "sub
rosa"85 plans.86
IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE BANKRUPTCY PLAN
Chrysler's creditors and outside observers voiced fierce
opposition to the § 363 sale.87 Many claimed that the government's
the courts "have identified an 'apparent conflict' between the expedient of a § 363(b)
sale and the otherwise applicable features and safeguards of Chapter 11.") (citing In
re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1071).
81. See id. at 114.
82. See In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir.1983) (noting that
sub rosa 363 plans could "short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for
confirmation of a reorganization plan"); see also Brege, supra note 59, at 1655 ("[A]
section 363 [sale] appears to offer a side door to escape the rigors of the typical
bankruptcy plan confirmation.").
83. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 116 (recognizing the concern senior
creditors could "strong-arm the debtor-in-possession, and bypass the requirements of
Chapter 11 to cash out quickly at the expense of other stakeholders").
84. See In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 940 ("The debtor and the Bankruptcy Court
should not be able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of
a reorganization play by establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection
with a sale of assets.").
85. 'Sub rosa' is a Latin phrase meaning "under the rose," and it generally
connotes secrecy. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). While courts have
questioned the usefulness of the term "sub rosa," the term generally refers either to a
§ 363 sale that bypasses the requirements of § 363 sales set out by Lionel and it
progeny, or to a § 363 sale that dictates the proceedings of a Chapter 11 proceeding
while bypassing Chapter 11 requirements. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 117
("The term 'sub rosa' is something of a misnomer. It bespeaks a covert or secret
activity, whereas secrecy has nothing to do with a § 363 transaction.").
86. See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The
trustee is prohibited from such use, sale or lease [under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)] if it would
amount to a sub rosa plan of reorganization.").
87. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 113-117; Stephen J. Lubben, The Truth
About Detroit's Bankruptcies, FORBES, July 7, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/
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attempt to stabilize the auto industry significantly increased the
risk of secured lending in the United States.8 The Objecting
Creditor's objections were mostly legal in nature. 9 Outside
observers (Observers), including journalists, legal scholars, and
hedge fund managers, who were not senior creditors to Chrysler,
voiced concern that ethical barriers were broken and feared the
pragmatic ramifications of the supposed subordination of
Chrysler's secured lenders to unsecured creditors. 90
The Objecting Creditors appealed the Bankruptcy Court's
decision on four grounds.9 First, Objecting Creditors challenged
the constitutionality of the use of TARP funds to bail out Chrysler
and finance the company's bankruptcy.9 Second, the Objecting
Creditors appealed the order granting limited liability to New
Chrysler for existing and future tort claims arising from Chrysler.93
Third, the Objecting Creditors argued that the proceeding was an
impermissible sub rosa plan and should not be allowed under 11
U.S.C. § 363(b). 94 Lastly, the Objecting Creditors argued that the
§ 363 sale impermissibly subordinates their interests to the
interests of unsecured creditors in violation of the absolute priority
rule and 11 U.S.C. § 363.9'
07/26/chrysler-gm-bankruptcy-opinions-contributors-chapter-11-tarp.html
(responding to the criticisms of Chrysler's bankruptcy proceedings); McCullagh,
supra note 6.
88. See Bill Frezza, Obama to Secured Creditors: Drop Dead, REAL CLEAR
MARKETS, May 4, 2009, http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2009/05/obama-to_
securedcreditors-dro.html.
89. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 114-116, 119-120, 121, 123-124.
90. See McCullagh, supra note 6; Roe, supra note 3; Frezza, supra note 88; Press
Release, Clifford S. Asness, Managing and Founding Principal of AQR Capital
Management, LLC, Unafraid In Greenwich Connecticut (May 5, 2009),
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/a-hedge-fund-manager-strikes-back-at-
obama/.
91. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 112-113.
92. See id. The majority of Observers do not take issue with the government's
use of TARP funds to bail out the auto industry. Therefore, this claim is outside the
scope of this Comment and will not be discussed.
93. Id. at 123-124. The majority of Observers do not take issue with the
limitation of New Chrysler's liability for products and actions of Chrysler. Therefore,
this claim is outside the scope of this Comment and will not be discussed.
94. Id. at 112-113.
95. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 41, at 2, 53 ("The Treasury's actions also
violate the fundamental rules of priority and circumvent statutory protections
attendant to a chapter 11 reorganization."); In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 112-113.
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The brunt of the Observers' argument was that the
executive branch over-stepped legal and ethical boundaries by
negotiating the § 363 sale between Chrysler and its secured
lenders. 96 Observers argued that the executive branch upset the
United States' "world leading" bankruptcy procedures by bullying
Chrysler's creditors into accepting a settlement that they would
not have accepted without overt pressure from the President.97 In
turn, Observers maintained that the government's intervention in
Chrysler's bankruptcy set a standard that will dissuade creditors
from making fully secured loans to large companies.98
Most of the objections to the settlement from both the
Objecting Creditors and Observers are grounded in arguments
that the court's ruling does not comply with current case law and
that it violates § 363 sales requirements."
A. Did the § 363 Sale Comply with Current Case Law?
The first argument raised by the Objecting Creditors was
that the sale was a sub rosa plan because it improperly
subordinated the rights of creditors and was therefore
impermissible under current law.1° While the § 363 sale affected a
future Chapter 11 reorganization, it is permissible because it did
not dictate proceedings of a future Chapter 11 plan.
Chrysler's § 363 sale was consistent with the spirit of the
bankruptcy process. The overarching purpose of reorganizing a
business like Chrysler through bankruptcy is to preserve the value
of the debtor's assets and prevent the company from qulaung.l01
96. See Visnic, supra note 6.
97. See Press Release, The Committee of Chrysler Non-Tarp Lenders, Statement
from the Non-TARP Lenders to Chrysler (Apr. 30, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/
deals/2009/04/30/statement-from-non-tarp-lenders-of-chrysler/ [hereinafter Statement
from Non-TARP Lenders]; see also Roe, supra note 3; Frezza, supra note 88 ("Are
you following the disembowelment of Chrysler's secured creditors ... [and] what it
could do to the very concept of secured debt?").
98. See Frezza, supra note 88.
99. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 41, at 8 (arguing that the court ignored
the precedent on § 363 sales set by In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir.
1983)).
100. See id. at 49.
101. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) ("[Tlhe
fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent the debtor from going into
2010]
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One of the primary goals of a § 363 sale is to "maximize asset
value by the sale of the debtor's business as a going concern.
'' 2
Maximizing the value of the assets and avoiding liquidation
enhances the value of the company, thus increasing the likelihood
of recovery for the company's creditors °3
Citing Lionel, the Second Circuit emphasized that courts
should reject § 363 sales that are not justified by a "good business
reason."' ° One of the most common business reasons that courts
rely on is whether a delay in acceptance of a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization will drastically reduce the value of property to be
sold.105 Undoubtedly, Chrysler was in an emergency situation
when it filed for bankruptcy; the company lost substantial value in
the prior year, and it was losing over $100 million per day.1°6 More
importantly, Chrysler and Fiat's proposed alliance, which rested
on the government's acceptance of Chrysler's Viability Plan, was
about to expire.' °7 If that deal was not completed, Chrysler would
have been forced to liquidate, which would have reduced the value
of Chrysler's assets from $2 billion to approximately $800
million.08 As the Second Circuit appropriately found, "consistent
with an underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code-maximizing
the value of the bankrupt estate-it was no abuse of discretion to
determine that the Sale prevented further, unnecessary losses. ' °9
Chrysler was in a dire situation, and a § 363 sale was the proper
remedy.
liquidation."); In re Capitol Food Corp. of Fields Comer, 490 F.3d 21, 25 (2007)
(noting that a primary function of chapter 11 bankruptcy is the preservation of a
business as going concerns and to maximize recoverable assets); Toibb v. Radloff, 501
U.S. 157, 163 (1991) ("[Chapter 111 embodies the general [Bankruptcy] Code policy
of maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate.").
102. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom.
Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009).
103. See Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al., No. 01-00056(PJW), 2001 WL 1820326,
at *11 (Bnkr. D. Del. April 2,2001).
104. See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722
F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that a court must "expressly find from the
evidence presented ... a good business reason to grant such an application").
105. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1066-1069.
106. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 118-119.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Id.
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Notwithstanding Chrysler's compliance with Lionel
standards, Objecting Creditors claim that the sale so significantly
affected any subsequent Chapter 11 proceeding that it is in
contradiction to the precedent set by the Fifth Circuit in In re
Braniff, Inc." The Objecting Creditors, however, based their
criticism on a flawed interpretation of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning
in Braniff. In Braniff, the Fifth Circuit rejected a proposed § 363
sale of substantially all of Braniff, Inc.'s assets because the sale
agreement improperly dictated many terms of any forthcoming
Chapter 11 plan.' Under the sale, Braniff, Inc. would have
transferred its assets in return for unsecured notes and airline
112ticket vouchers. This consideration could only be used in a
future reorganization of the company."3 More importantly, the
court focused on the fact that the plan would force secured
creditors "to vote a portion of their deficiency claim in favor of
any future reorganization plan approved by a majority of the
unsecured creditors' committee." 114 The court noted that forcing
creditors to vote their claim in a specified manner did not fit within
11 U.S.C. § 363's approval of a "use, sale, or lease" of assets."5
Therefore, the court found that the sale did not merely influence
Braniff's subsequent Chapter 11 plan, but rather dictated the
results of a Chapter 11 plan without approval by the creditors as
required by Chapter 11.116
The safeguards of a Chapter 11 proceeding do not strictly
limit the authority of a trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) as much as
the Objecting Creditors maintain."7  Citing Braniff, Objecting
110. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 41, at 49-50, 54 (citing In re Braniff
Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983) in support of their contention that a
court should not approve a ruling that "effectively undermines or eliminates the
chapter 11 process").
111. See In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 939-940.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. ld. at 940.
117. Cf. Brege, supra note 59, at 1640 (noting that one can sell an asset through 11
U.S.C. § 363(b) "without first going through the rigors of developing a reorganization
plan disposing of that asset"); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of
Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751,787 (Dec. 2002) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363 and noting
2010]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
Creditors maintain that a § 363 sale in which substantially all of a
company's assets are sold "must scale the hurdles erected in
Chapter 11.,,118 The safeguards of a Chapter 11 plan include, inter
alia, the requirements that the plan was proposed in good faith;
that creditors voted and approved of the plan; and that creditors'
recovery under Chapter 11 is larger than a recovery under a
Chapter 7 liquidation plan would have been. "9 However, a trustee
can sell the assets of a firm in a § 363 sale without developing a full
Chapter 11 plan. 120 Moreover, the Braniff court never stated that a
plan should be denied simply because it involved a sale of a
majority of the company's assets.12 Even outside the context of
§ 363 sales, commentators have noted that Chapter 11 is rarely "a
forum where the various stakeholders in a publicly held firm
negotiate among each other over the firm's destiny. 1 2  Rather,
lenders controlling a Chapter 11 proceeding "merely put[] in place
a preexisting deal."' 23
The Chrysler sale did not dictate the procedures of a
Chapter 11 proceeding. A sale of a company's assets will
124
undoubtedly influence any eventual Chapter 11 plan. Unlike in
that Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures "provide[] a mechanism for selling assets free
and clear of all claims even before a plan of reorganization is put in place").
118. Brief for Appellants, supra note 41, at 49-50 (citing In re Braniff Airways,
Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983)).
119. 11 U.S.C. §1129.
120. See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, 128 S.Ct. 2326, 2330 n.2
(2008); see also In re Baldwin-United Corp., 43 B.R. 888, 906 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1984) (approving the disposition of a major asset prior to the approval of full Chapter
11 plan of reorganization because the "debtors... are not dictating the terms of a
plan by way of [the] disposition"); Brege, supra note 59, at 1640 (noting that one can
sell an asset through 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) "without first going through the rigors of
developing a reorganization plan disposing of that asset"); Baird & Rasmussen, supra
note 117, at 787 ("Chapter 11 provides a mechanism for selling assets free and clear
of all claims even before a plan of reorganization is put in place.").
121. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108,113 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom.
Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009); see also In re
Braniff , 700 F.2d at 939 (refusing to rule on each individual factor of the sale,
including the amount of assets sold, because the lower courts did not focus on
individual factors but addressed the transaction as a whole).
122. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 117, at 752.
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 117 n.9; see Comm. Of Equity Sec.
Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1072 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Winter, J. dissenting) ("[A] reorganization plan affects the rights of the parties as
[Vol. 14
KEEPING SECURED LENDING SECURE
Braniff, the Chrysler sale does not specifically dictate the terms of
a Chapter 11 plan. 1' Chrysler sold substantially all of its assets in
its § 363 sale, but the company will still go through a full Chapter
11 proceeding.'26 Therefore, Chrysler's proceedings are consistent
with current precedent.'27
B. Were the Assets Sold to a New Company?
The Objecting Creditors also maintained that Chrysler's
§ 363 sale did not constitute a sale at all but was merely a
reorganization of the company. The Objecting Creditors insisted
that the substance of the plan consisted of setting aside toxic assets
for liquidation, partnering with a new company, and creating new
financial arrangements, all of which should take place through
Chapter 11 proceedings and not a § 363 sale. 29
Fiat management helped to guide Chrysler through
bankruptcy and now operates the company post-bankruptcy.3 °
Fiat is providing new technology, distribution outlets, and
management expertise valued between $3 billion and $8 billion. 131
Fiat has this control as part of the group that purchased the assets
from Chrysler. Even though the company purchasing Chrysler's
well as the disposition of assets, [but] there is no inconsistency in allowing the
disposition of property outside of the confirmation hearings.").
125. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 117 n.9 ("But it is not a 'sub rosa plan' in the
Braniff sense because it does not specifically 'dictate,' or 'arrange' ex ante, by
contract, the terms of any subsequent plan.").
126. See Michael J. de ]a Merced & Micheline Maynard, Fiat Takes Over Chrysler
After 42-Day Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009, at B4, available at 2009 WLNR
11155384; see also Nick Bunkley & Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Fights to Regain Lost
Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at B5, available at 2009 WLNR 24722234 (noting
that some of Chrysler's debts and several of its unwanted assets remain in Chapter
11).
127. See supra pp. 527-31 and notes 100-126.
128. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 41, at 44 ("The transaction before the
Court is a "Sale" in name only; upon consummation, [N]ew Chrysler will be [O]ld
Chrysler in essentially every respect.").
129. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 41, at 44-45.
130. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 119 (noting that Fiat's CEO will be
managing "New Chrysler" and that Fiat management's experience with turning
around troubled car companies is essential to "New Chrysler's" success).
131. See id. at 119; Brief for Appellants, supra note 41, at 10.
132. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 112 (noting that Fiat will receive a 20%
share of "New Chrysler," with the right to purchase up to 51% of the company, in
return for "provid[ing] ["]New Chrysler["] with certain fuel-efficient vehicle
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assets has been nicknamed "New Chrysler," the transaction
constitutes more than a simple reorganization of Chrysler itself.
1 33
The Objecting Creditors argue against the sale by
emphasizing that the new company would be selling many of the
same products as the old company. 134 This is, however, a common
feature and even a purpose of § 363 sales.1 35 Indeed, one of the
primary benefits of a § 363 sale is that it preserves the value of the
company as a going concern by keeping the assets together and
reestablishing control rights. 36 In keeping the assets together, the
purchaser may well use the assets in a manner similar to the
seller's use.137 For example, in Trans World Airlines, Inc., Trans
World Airlines (TWA) sold substantially all of its assets (including
gates, slots, and routes at hub airports as well as airplanes and
staff) to American Airlines.' American Airlines' interest in these
assets was to incorporate them into its current business and
.. 139
expand its operations.
With regards to business operations, Chrysler's § 363 sale
mirrors TWA's § 363 sale.140 Chrysler transferred the bulk of its
assets, including its factories, product offerings, and work force, to
platforms, access to its worldwide distribution system, and new management that is
experienced in turning around a failing auto company").
133. See supra pp. 530-31 and notes 125-132.
134. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 41, at at 44 ("[N]ew Chrysler["] will be
["O]ld Chrysler in essentially every respect. It will be called "Chrysler." ... It will
manufacture and sell Chrysler and Dodge cars and minivans, Jeeps and Dodge
Trucks.").
135. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al., No. 01-00056(PJW), 2001 WL
1820326 (Bnkr. D. Del. April 2, 2001) (approving Trans World Airlines selling
substantially all of its assets, including gates, hubs, slots, routs, planes and an
experienced workforce to AMR Corporation (American Airlines)). American
Airlines would use these assets to assist in operating its business.
136. Cf Trans World Airlines, 2001 WL 1820326. The court noted that a § 363
sale would preserve the value of TWA as a going concern and would provide for the
transfer of substantially all of TWA's assets to American, who would use the assets in
a manner that would preserve 20,000 jobs. Id. at *14. Basically, a substantial
majority of TWA's assets and would now be placed under the control of American;
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 117, at 786 (noting that in the market for selling firms
as going concerns "a straightforward path exists for keeping the assets of the firm
together and reestablishing coherent control rights").
137. See supra note 135.
138. See Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al., No. 01-00056(PJW), 2001 WL 1820326,
at *5, *8 (Bnkr. D. Del. April 2, 2001).
139. See id.
140. See id.
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Fiat, who incorporated them into its business and expanded its
automobile manufacturing and sales operations. In short, if
Chrysler's § 363 sale is considered sub rosa, then virtually every
§ 363 sale would be labeled sub rosa.142
C. Did the Sale Impermissibly Subordinate the Interests of
Secured Creditors?
Objecting Creditors maintained that this particular § 363
sale improperly subordinated the interests of secured lenders to
those of unsecured lenders and violated the priority rules of
Chapter 11.143 As the Court of Appeals confirmed, this claim lacks
merit.' 44 As previously mentioned, the absolute priority rule states
that senior secured creditors are to be paid in full before junior
creditors receive any payment. Contrary to Objecting Creditors'
claims, the absolute priority rule was followed: unsecured lenders
did not receive anything that belonged to secured lenders.
46
Under the sale, all of the proceeds were paid to the secured
priority lenders.47  Any equity stakes in New Chrysler that
benefited unsecured creditors emanated from new sources (e.g.,
government loans, new technology from Fiat, and new
management from Fiat). 48  Because these assets emanated from
new sources and were not part of the debtor's estate, these assets
were not subject to liens of the secured lenders. 149 Therefore, the
141. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom.
Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009).
142. See Brief for Debtors-Appellees Chrysler LLC, et al., at 31, In re Chrysler
LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009).
143. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 112.
144. Id. at 118-119.
145. See supra notes 53-55.
146. See Lubben, supra note 87 ("The consideration for that sale goes to the 'old'
debtor, and will be distributed according to the absolute priority rule.").
147. See In re Chrysler LLC, et al., 405 B.R. 85, 97-98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009),
affd, 576 F.3d 108 (2nd Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension
Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009) ("Not one penny of value of the
Debtors' assets is going to anyone other than the First-Lien Lenders.").
148. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 118-119.
149. See id. at 118 ("[AIll the equity stakes in New Chrysler were entirely
attributable to new value-including governmental loans, new technology, and new
management-which were not assets of the debtor's estate.") (citing In re Chrysler,
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government did not take assets from the senior lenders and give
them to junior unsecured creditors.5
Furthermore, courts have noted that the absolute priority
rule need not be followed in a § 363 sale as long as other major
factors outlined in Lionel and its progeny justify deviating from
the rule.151 Therefore, even if the bankruptcy court had not strictly
followed the absolute priority rule, the court would still be
following established precedent.
The government bailed out the junior creditors in the sense
that the government's new investment in Chrysler largely
benefited the UAW. While one may question the government's
decision to support the UAW, it has no effect on the legality of
Chrysler's § 363 sale or bankruptcy proceedings in general.
Unsecured lenders did not receive anything that rightfully
belonged to secured lenders.' This transaction was in compliance
with current bankruptcy code. 56
D. Was There Any Impropriety in the Negotiation of the Sale?
Objecting Creditors took issue with both sides of the
negotiations of the § 363 sale: they claimed that secured lenders
were unfairly forced to negotiate with the Treasury Department
through a large group of banks, and that the government
LLC et al., 405 B.R. 85 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), affd, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009)).
150. Id. at 118.
151. See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 463 (2d Cir. 2007) ("When a
settlement is presented for court approval apart from a reorganization plan, however,
the priority rule of 11 U.S.C. § 1129 is not necessarily implicated."). There are other
instances in which the absolute priority rule need not be followed. See generally
Clifford S. Harris, Note, A Rule Unvanquished: The New Value Exception to the
Absolute Priority Rule, 89 MICH.L.REV. 2301 (Aug. 1991) (detailing several
exceptions to the absolute priority rule).
152. See supra note 151.
153. See Roe, supra note 3 ("[T]he de facto deal was really that the government
bought Chrysler from the creditors, giving it to the UAW, flooding Chrysler with
cash, and hiring Fiat to manage it.").
154. See Lubben, supra note 87.
155. See id. ("The consideration for that sale goes to the 'old' debtor, and will be
distributed according to the absolute priority rule.").
156. 11 U.S.C. § 1129; see supra pp. 533-34 and notes 145-155.
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"outstepped legal and ethical boundaries" in negotiating the
settlement.' 57
1. Objections to Negotiations Led by TARP-Funded Banks
Some Observers were adamant in their contention that the
executive branch's involvement in Chrysler's bankruptcy set a
dangerous precedent that will hurt secured lending in the United
States. 8  Specifically, these Observers took issue with the
negotiation process because they claimed that the TARP-backed
banks were hesitant to oppose the Treasury Department. 159 Yet
three facts undermine the Observers' position on this issue.
First, the creditors were bound to negotiate through
TARP-backed banks. Through a series of agreements including
the creditor contracts that were assumed when creditors first
acquired Chrysler's debt, the creditors ceded control to a
designated agent.16° In this case, that agent was the lead lender,
JPMorgan Chase Bank NA. 6 ' As the Second Circuit noted, "any
action the agent takes at the request of the lenders holding a
majority of Chrysler's debt is binding on all lenders, those who
agree and those who do not.' ' 162 Because lenders holding a vast
majority of Chrysler's secured debt agreed to the § 363 sale, the
agent properly authorized the § 363 sale of the assets. 63 In short,
the Observers "avoid the inconvenient fact that [they], and
157. Visnic, supra note 6; see Statement from Non-TARP Lenders, supra note 96.
158. See Frezza, supra note 88 ("Why would anyone lend money to heavily
unionized companies knowing that if things went wrong, the president and his men
could trash their security interests by executive decree, hold them up to public
vilification, and subject them to future retribution by regulators?").
159. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lenders Fault Treasury in Chrysler Bankruptcy, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (April 30, 2009, 12:26 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.coml
2009/04/30/chrysler-lenders-fault-government-as-bankruptcy-looms/.
160. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 120 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom.
Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009); see also
Lubben, supra note 87 (noting that all parties buying into loan agreed to "majority
rule").
161. See Lubben, supra note 87.
162. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 120.
163. In re Chrysler LLC, et al., 405 B.R. 85, 102 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), affid, 576
F.3d 108 (2nd Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v.
Chrysler LLC, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009).
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everyone else buying into this loan, agreed to 'majority rule'," and
the majority agreed to the § 363 sale.' 64
Second, Chrysler's creditors were reasonable to accept the
proposed payment of twenty-nine percent of their original debts.
161
Without government assistance, Chrysler was unappealing to
investors, and the company would likely have been liquidated.66
In liquidation Chrysler would have lost any goodwill value.'67
Therefore, the dealmakers believed that if Chrysler was liquidated
the secured lenders would receive even less than twenty-nine cents
per dollar invested.' 6 Courts have previously approved § 363 sales
when there is no evidence that the creditors would be better off
. 169
going through an extended Chapter 11 proceeding. The secured
creditors made a sound business decision in accepting a payout of
twenty-nine percent of their original investment and the court
made a sound legal decision in approving the sale.
Furthermore, the secured lenders received a payout equal
to the loan's open market trading value.7 ° In the months leading
up to the bankruptcy filing, Chrysler's secured loans traded
between fifteen and seventy-five cents per dollar loaned.171 The
Indiana Pension Funds, who led the objections to the § 363 sale,
purchased Chrysler debt for forty-three cents per dollar loaned in
July 2008.172 In the month before the filing, the loans were valued
164. Lubben, supra note 87.
165. See id.
166. See Roe, supra note 3; Steven Bavaria, GM, Chrysler and the Secured Loan
Market, LEVERAGED FINANCE NEWS, June 4, 2009, http://www.leveragedfinance
news.com/blog/your-take/-194063-1.html.
167. See Bavaria, supra note 166 ("[Liquidating the company] would mean its
assets would have been sold off piecemeal, with whatever goodwill that may have
once been included in its valuation lost forever.").
168. See Roe, supra note 3 ( "[G]overnment deal makers believe that Chrysler's
liquidation value, which is what the secured creditors were entitled to, was even less
than what they're getting in the plan.").
169. See Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al., 2001 WL 1820326, 2001 WL 1820326, at
*14 (Bnkr. D. Del. April 2, 2001).
170. See Bavaria, supra note 166.
171. See id.
172. See Richard Mourdock, Treasurer of the State of Ind., Driving in the Wrong
Direction, Address to the Cato Institute, (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.coyote
blog.com/coyote-blog/2009/10/government-strongarm-tactics-in-the-chrysler-
bankrupcy.htmi. These funds purchased approximately $43 million dollars of
Chrysler's secured debt for approximately $17 million. Id.
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as low as thirteen cents per dollar loaned.73 Therefore, the lenders
saw twenty-nine cents per dollar loaned as a reasonable offer.
17 4
Moreover, recent investors who purchased the debt below twenty-
nine cents per dollar loaned could make money at a buyout of
twenty-nine cents per dollar loaned. 75 Most importantly, the fact
that the secured lenders received payment comparable to prices
offered in open market trading reaffirms the value of secured
loans generally.7 6 Creditors were wise to accept the settlement.
Third, even lenders who did not receive TARP funding
were satisfied with the settlement.77 Overall, lenders holding
approximately ninety percent of the loans supported the
178
settlement. Many of these creditors did not receive TARP funds
but still approved of the settlement. 179 The Objecting Creditors'
claim that the TARP funded banks only accepted the settlement
due to government pressure is unwarranted.
2. Objections to the Role of the Executive Branch in Negotiations
Another major objection to the settlement is premised on
the belief that the executive branch crossed "legal and ethical
boundaries" while facilitating the deal between Chrysler and its
secured lendersfu This claim lacks merit. Observers assert that
the executive branch used its power to control the restructuring
process of Chrysler and to create a result that the President felt
was fair.18 1 While the executive branch, through the Auto Task
173. Katherine Burton, Sree Bhaktavatsalam & Pierre Paulden, Yale, Halliburton,
Gates Foundation Listed as Chrysler Lenders, BLOOMBERG, May 2, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=al9vAXclorI.
174. See Bavaria, supra note 166.
175. See Burton et. al., supra note 173.
176. See Bavaria, supra note 166.
177. See Burton et. al., supra note 173.
178. In re Chrysler LLC, et al., 405 B.R. 84, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), affd, 576 F.3d
108, (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler
LLC, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009).
179. See Burton et. al., supra note 173. These investors include Elliot
Management Corp. and York Capital Management LP. Id.
180. See Visnic, supra note 6.
181. See Jo-el J. Meyer, Bankruptcy: Pension Funds Challenge Chrysler Sale, Say
Secured Lenders' Rights 'Trampled, 92 BBR 1225 (May 26, 2009); see also Roe, supra
note 3 ("[U]sually bankruptcy players--even lenders providing new money--do not
get to decide whether the deal was fair.").
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Force, was the leader of the negotiations between Chrysler and its
creditors, no evidence was brought forth that it improperly exerted
its influence on the secured lenders.18 ' Though the executive
branch did play a large role in Chrysler's debt workout
negotiations, the bankruptcy proceedings were subject to review
by the judicial branch. 18 ' The reviewing courts found that
Chrysler's § 363 sale was legally valid.M
Moreover, it was entirely within the executive branch's
authority to assist in negotiating the sale because of its position as
DIP financer (Financer).85 When large firms like Chrysler enter
Chapter 11, they are typically illiquid and unable to operate
without significant financing from outside investors.'6 The control
that a Financer has over the funds needed by the bankrupt
company gives the Financer substantial control over that
company's operations.1 8 ' As a result, the Financer, be it the
government, a large financial institution, or a private individual,
has substantial say in whether or not the company will sell its
assets under a § 363 plan 88
182. Michael J. de la Merced, 2 Lawyers on the G.M. Case Tell Their Story, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (July 25, 2009, 20:38 EST), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/07/25/2-lawyers-on-the-gm-case-tell-their-stor/ ("[T]he auto task force handl[ed]
the actual negotiations with [Chrysler's] secured lenders."); see also Lubben, supra
note 87 ("Chrysler's senior lenders had agreed by contract to have JPMorgan Chase,
the lead lender, negotiate on their behalf. We would have heard if Jamie Dimon felt
Chase was being strong-armed into supporting the sale.").
183. See In re Chrysler LLC, et al., 405 B.R. at 93.
184. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 120 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom.
Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009).
185. See infra note 187; see also In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 112 (noting that
the government provided financing for the sale as debtor-in-possession). The full 336
page DIP contract between the United States government and Chrysler can be found
at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/AIFP/chryslerDip.pdf.
186. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 117, at 784-785.
187. See, e.g., In re Western Pacific Airlines, Inc., 223 B.R. 567 (Bnkr. D. Colo.
1997) (authorizing a Chapter 11 debtor-airline to obtain financing needed to continue
operating its business and prevent loss of value associated with many of its assets;
terms of financing included allowing lender to appoint directors to debtor-airline's
board of directors thus giving lender substantial control of debtor's operations); see
also Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 117, at 785 ("These revolving credit facilities and
the practical control they give lenders over a firm are some of the most striking
changes in Chapter 11 practice over the last twenty years .... For the firms that are
likely to survive as going concerns, professional investors ensure that they remain in
control, regardless of whether the firm is inside of bankruptcy or out.").
188. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 117, at 785.
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In the present case, Chrysler was losing millions of dollars a
day and the government provided DIP financing through multi-
billion dollar loans. 189  Therefore, in its role as Financer, the
government was able to influence the bankruptcy process and push
for a § 363 sale. Yet the influence exerted by the executive branch
was no greater than that exercised by other financers in other
transactions.'90 Overall, the Objector's claims of impropriety in the
negotiation of the § 363 sale lacked evidence and failed to stand up
to close scrutiny.
V. SECURED DEBT REMAINS SECURE
Objecting Creditors and Observers argued that Chrysler's
§ 363 proceeding created a new, disastrous standard of arbitrary
subordination of secured debt.'91 Commentators have proclaimed
that investors will shy away from lending, even on a secured basis,
to companies like Chrysler in the future.92 These claims are
exaggerated and lack merit.
Barring another extreme catastrophic economic event, it is
unlikely that the government will further invest in private
companies like Chrysler. 93 The government never intended to bail
out the auto industry.94 Originally, the government only provided
loans to Chrysler in an effort to spur the company to finding future
189. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 112 (noting that the government provided
financing for the sale as debtor-in-possession).
190. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 117.
191. See Roe, supra note 3; Frezza, supra note 88.
192. See Frezza, supra note 88 ("Why would anyone lend money to heavily
unionized companies knowing that if things went wrong, the president and his men
could trash their security interest by executive decree, hold them up to public
vilification, and subject them to future retribution by regulators?").
193. See infra pp. 539-40 and notes 194-199.
194. See Press Release, The White House, Obama Administration Auto
Restructuring Initiative General Motors Restructuring (June 1, 2009),
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/05312009_gm-factsheet.html [hereinafter
Auto Restructuring Initiative] ("Consistent with the goal of clearly limiting the
government's role as a reluctant equity owner but careful steward of taxpayer
resources ... [t]he government has no desire to own equity stakes in companies any
longer than necessary, and will seek to dispose of its ownership interests as soon as
practicable.")(emphasis added); see also Nora Macaluso, Treasury Financing:
Chrysler Financial Gets 1.5 Billion in TARP Funding to Spur Car Loans, 92 BBR 184
(Jan. 27, 2009) ("[Tlhe [Treasury] department does not want to expand its
automotive aid program beyond current levels.").
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funding through other means.'9 5  Before the bailouts, the
government clarified that it did not want to increase aid to the
automotive industry.96  Since the bailouts, the government has
stated that it does not intend to provide any additional aid to the
auto industry.' 9 Thus the government has always been a reluctant
investor and only got involved to prevent another sector of the
U.S. economy from failing during drastic economic times.9  Even
in the unlikely event of future government intervention, adopting
simple measures discussed below would negate this issue.' 99
The circumstances surrounding the Chrysler bankruptcy
are so rare that this case lacks significant precedential value. 200
First, there was substantial pressure from the American public for
the government to get involved.2 0' Due to the public outcry against
the government's use of the TARP funding to exclusively bail out
banks and Wall Street firms, the government was under pressure
to also assist rank-and-file employees.2 2 In Chrysler's bankruptcy,
the pressure for government assistance intensified since many of
Chrysler's employees were members the UAW, a politically
195. See Macaluso, supra note 194 ("The government official said the terms are
designed to provide incentives for the company to look for future funding through
other programs, or through improved market conditions .... ").
196. See id. ("[T]he [Treasury] department does not want to expand its automotive
aid program beyond current levels.").
197. See Nick Bunkley, Wait is Likely for Chrysler's I.P.0, Adviser Says,
N.Y.TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 5, 2009, 14:01 EST) http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/08/05/chrysler-ipo-likely-later-than-2010-auto-adviser-says/ ("[Tlhe government
is not considering giving more financial aid to parts makers beyond the $5 billion that
already has gone to the many companies in that sector of the industry that are in or
near bankruptcy.").
198. See Auto Restructuring Initiative, supra note 194 ("Consistent with the goal
of clearly limiting the government's role as a reluctant equity owner but careful
steward of taxpayer resources . .. [t]he government has no desire to own equity
stakes in companies ... and will seek to dispose of its ownership interest as soon as
practicable.")(emphasis added); Roe, supra note 3 ("Chrysler was ... a visibly
troubled company in a traditionally important industry, suffering during a severe
economic downturn.... Burned by the Lehman [Brothers bank] failure, government
players might not have wanted to see that movie again.").
199. Infra pp. 542-44 and notes 217-227.
200. See Sorkin, supra note 42.
201. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 3 ("The government felt pressure to do something
directly for blue collar types to balance this pro-Wall Street perception.").
202. See id.
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influential union.'° Without governmental assistance, it is unlikely
that another company could match the speed of Chrysler's
bankruptcy.2°4 In short, the "perfect storm" of circumstances
surrounding Chrysler's bankruptcy was so spectacularly rare that it
gives Chrysler's bankruptcy limited precedential value.0 5
The limited precedential value is easily recognizable when
looking at two major bankruptcy cases since Chrysler's
proceedings. In GM's bankruptcy the secured lenders claims were
paid in full. 20  Moreover, in the bankruptcy proceedings of
Delphi,207 a major part supplier to the automotive industry, the
bankruptcy judge refused to use Chrysler's bankruptcy as a model
for Delphi's proceeding.2 8 Though Delphi used a § 363 sale, its
broad, public bidding process allowed its secured creditors the
opportunity to assume control of the company and achieve a
higher return than a private, government brokered § 363 sale.2°9 If
Chrysler's bankruptcy had set a new standard, then GM and
Delphi would have followed it. Chrysler's bankruptcy has not set
new precedent that negatively affects the viability of secured
203. See id. ("Chrysler was ... politically well-positioned, with an influential
union.").
204. See Roe, supra note 3 ("[S]ince government money doesn't fuel ordinary
chapter 11 reorganizations, there's one reason to think Chrysler was a stand-alone
bankruptcy event.").
205. See Sorkin, supra note 42 (discussing Chrysler's "near-perfect storm of
extenuating circumstances").
206. See GM Lender Payout Augurs Well for Secured Loan Markets, DBRS CAN.
NEWSL., Vol. 1, Issue 8, June 3, 2009, available at http://www.dbrs.com/research/
228854/dbrs-canada-newsletter/gm-lender-payout-augurs-well-for-secured-loan-
markets.pdf; Roe, supra note 3.
207. In re Delphi, No. 05-44481(RDD), 2009 WL 2482146 (Bnkr. S.D.N.Y. July 30,
2009); see also David McLaughlin & Mike Spector, End of Saga: Delphi Wins OK to
Exit Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2009, at B1, available at http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB124897411664794259.html (discussing the Delphi's bankruptcy
procedures).
208. See Roe, supra note 3. In Delphi, the judge allowed for a much broader
process for current creditors and outside investors to bid on Delphi's assets than did
the judge in Chrysler's bankruptcy. See In re Delphi, 2009 WL 2482146; McLaughlin
& Spector, supra note 207.
209. See In re Delphi, 2009 WL 2482146, at *5-*6; McLaughlin & Spector, supra
note 207. This process resulted in Delphi's secured creditors purchasing the assets in
exchange for forgiveness of approximately $3.4 billion in loans. Id.; see Opinion
Letter, Samuel Jordan, Washington Legal Foundation, Whither Creditors' Rights?,
(Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalopinionletter/082809
JordanLOL.pdf.
2010]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
lending in America. Instead, Chrysler's bankruptcy should be
viewed as the proper application of bankruptcy rules in an
exceedingly rare situation.
Even though the circumstances surrounding the
government's involvement with Chrysler were highly unusual, the
means by which the government helped to reorganize Chrysler was
"not unprecedented. '"21 In fact, as one bankruptcy law professor
noted, the procedure "was entirely ordinary."2"' While perhaps not
on the same size or scale of Chrysler's sale, § 363 sales are a
routine and reasonable solution should a large corporation like
Chrysler go bankrupt.212 This sale met the requirements set out in
Lionel and paid creditors in complete compliance with the United
States Bankruptcy Code.1 3 Chrysler's § 363 sale reinforces current
bankruptcy procedures. It will not hamper secured credit in the
United States.
A. Changes Resulting From Chrysler's § 363 Sale
As one Washington Post analyst noted, "the market is
always changing; ignoring the problem doesn't help., 21 4 Though
Chrysler's bankruptcy proceeding complied with existing law,
several changes will result from the publicity it attracted.215
The Objecting Creditors were upset by the government's
role in the debt workout negotiations. 6 Therefore, lenders might
now insist on political intervention covenants to address the risks
of government intervention, similar to those now used in loan
contracts with debtors in developing countries. 217 These covenants
210. See Lubben, supra note 87.
211. See id.
212. See supra note 72; cf. Lubben, supra note 87 ("Chapter 11 now routinely
involves a sale early in the case, with the remainder of the case devoted to
distributing the proceeds of the sale among the creditors.").
213. See supra pp. 527-31 and notes 100-126.
214. Lessons From the Fall of Giants, WASH. POST, July 29, 2009, http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/03/AR20090803029 49.html.
215. See infra notes 218 and 221.
216. See supra notes 180-181.
217. See Posting of Kenneth Anderson to the Volokh Conspiracy Blog, http://vol
okh.com/archives/archive_2009_05_31-20090606.shtml#1243955114 (June 2, 2009,
11:05 EST) (noting that poison put provisions addressing political risk "allocates the
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218
could possibly be in the form of poison put provisions. Also,
lenders may now decide to purchase political intervention
insurance in order to better hedge against the risks of future
government involvement. 2 9 Both of these concepts are in use in
American contracts with less developed countries and could be
incorporated into lender contracts with companies in the United
States.220
Additionally, lenders will likely focus on the rights to
221control debt workout negotiations. Objecting Creditors
complained that they were forced to negotiate through TARP
funded banks.222 Objecting Creditors were forced to do so because
they agreed to "majority rule" when they purchased Chrysler
debt.223  Had these minority creditors not agreed to "majority
rule," they would likely have had a stronger voice in the
negotiations with the government.224 Due to their minority status,
these lenders may not have had the bargaining power to negotiate
around "majority rule." However, if smaller lenders are unable to
risk" among various parties and "gives the borrower-corporation some incentive not
to seek government involvement").
218. Generally used in bonds, poison put clauses allow a bondholder to redeem
the bond before maturity if a certain event happens. See Investorwords.com,
http://www.investorwords.com/7440/poison-put.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2009).
Here, a poison put clause could state that the debt could be called if the federal
government became an equity holder in the debtor company. Cf. Anderson, supra
note 217.
219. See generally The Political Risk Insurance Center, PRI Essentials,
http://www.pri-center.com/directories/priessentials.cfm ("[Political Risk Insurance
(PRI)] allows investors to concentrate on the commercial aspects of investments,
with the comfort that someone else - PRI providers - will help them avoid potential
losses, or reimburse them in case of a covered loss related to political causes.").
Admittedly, political risk insurance is quite complex and product offerings may not
fit all risks of various investors. See Jennifer Caplan, Political Risk: Run for Cover?,
CFO.coM, Jan. 22, 2002, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3003066?f=related.
However, a number of reputable companies, including Lloyd's of London, currently
offer various political risk insurance policies. Id.
220. See Anderson, supra note 217.
221. See infra p. 544 and note 225.
222. See Sorkin, supra note 153.
223. Supra pp. 535 and notes 160-164.
224. Cf. Lubben, supra note 87 (arguing that the lenders who bought into the loan
agreement voluntarily agreed to majority rule).
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negotiate out of majority rule clauses, they can simply choose not
to lend to companies borrowing from large TARP backed banks.
22
'
Overall, many of the current default rules of investor
226contracts are freely changeable by agreement. Therefore, any of
the above suggestions can be negotiated into a contract to offer
lenders even more security than they currently have.227 In the
future, creditors can mitigate the risk of government involvement
by adopting these policies.
VI. CONCLUSION
Chrysler's § 363 sale was a high profile, highly publicized
event that took place during a time of uncharacteristic government
involvement in the economy. Many people not only were
disgruntled with government bailouts out, but also were
overwhelmed by the government leading a company into and out
of bankruptcy.28 A small minority of creditors objected to the
• 229
proceedings. Yet their arguments against the § 363 sale of
Chrysler's assets failed to convince the trial court, failed to
convince the Second Circuit, and were not novel enough to receive
Supreme Court review.23° Chrysler's bankruptcy complied with
written law and relevant precedent.23' The executive branch and
the courts respected the priority of secured lenders. Chrysler's
bankruptcy and the executive branch's involvement have not set a
new standard and have not hampered secured credit in the United
States. In the end, "it is much easier to criticize unusual
characteristics of bankruptcy law than it is to truly understand and
225. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 117, at 18 ("Control rights are allocated
through the corporate charter, the securities the firm issues, and the debt contracts
into which it enters. Legal rules themselves also grant control rights. Many of these
are default rules that investors change by agreement.").
226. See id. at 18.
227. See Anderson, supra note 217.
228. See, e.g., Frezza, supra note 88 (lamenting the governments role in Chrysler's
bankruptcy filing).
229. See supra p. 537 and note 178.
230. In re Chrysler LLC, et al., 405 B.R. 85 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), affd, 576 F.3d
108, (2nd Cir. 2009), cert. denied, Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC,
129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009).
231. See supra pp. 528-31 and notes 104-127.
232. See supra pp. 533-34 and notes 143-156.
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justify them. '' 233 Present criticisms do not stand up to an in-depth
review of both the policies and the pragmatic effects of Chrysler's
§ 363 sale.
SPENCER C. ROBINSON
233. Brege, supra note 59, 1644-45.
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